Perhaps the most influential view of category-specific deficits is one in which the dissociation between living and non-living kinds reflects differential reliance on, or weighting of visual or associative-functional attributes. We present data collected from two patients, which question the apparent relationship between category-specific deficits and loss of specific attribute types. One patient with dementia of Alzheimer's type presented with relatively poor performance on living things but failed to show a difference between knowledge of visual and associative-functional information. The other patient with semantic dementia demonstrated relatively poor knowledge of visual attributes but failed to exhibit a category-specific impairment for animate kinds. In fact her comprehension and naming were slightly but significantly better for living things. The data are discussed with reference to various theories of category-specific impairment. We suggest that category-specific deficits for living things probably results from a combination of atrophy to medial and neocortical temporal structures, including the inferior temporal lobe. It is proposed that at the behavioural level, category-specific deficits arise when both critical identifying attributes of knowledge are lost and the intercorrelation between features causes disintegration of the category such that each exemplar 'regresses' towards a category prototype.
Introduction
Since the publication of Warrington's (1975) seminal paper on the selective breakdown of semantic memory, there has been a steady stream of papers which have reported various category-specific deficits, that is relatively impaired performance for particular domains of knowledge. The focus of our present paper is on the distinction between living and non-living categories. The majority of patients who show differences between the living and non-living categories have relatively spared comprehension and naming of non-living or man-made objects but poor ability with living or animate kinds. This deficit has been noted most often for patients who have suffered from herpes simplex virus encephalitis, HSVE (Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Pietrini et al., 1988; Silveri and Gainotti, 1988; Sartori and Job, 1988; Sartori et al., 1993a,b; Sheridan and Humphreys, 1993; De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1994; Wilson et al., 1995; Funnell and De Mornay Davies, 1996; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996; Wilson, 1997) , although this pattern has also been reported after head injury (Farah et al., 1989 Laiacona et al., 1993; Wilson, 1997) , vascular accidents (Hart et al., 1985; Farah and Wallace, 1992; Sartori et al., 1993a; Howard et al., 1995; Forde et al., 1997) , dementia of Alzheimer's type or DAT (Silveri et al., 1991; Mauri et al., 1994; Montanes et al., 1995; Daum et al., 1996; Tippett et al., 1996b; Gonnerman et al., 1997; Garrard et al., 1998) , and occasionally in semantic dementia (Basso et al., 1988; Breedin et al., 1994a; Barbarotto et al., 1995; Cardebat et al., 1996; Hodges et al., 1998; Lambon Ralph et al., 1998) . The opposite dissociation, better performance on living than non-living kinds, has been reported in only a handful of studies, normally as a consequence of cerebrovascular accident (CVA) (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983 Hillis et al., 1990; Hillis and Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett and Humphreys, 1992; Breedin et al., 1994a) , although it was exhibited by a group of patients after anterior left temporal lobectomy (Tippett et al., 1996a) , by a single patient with progressive atrophy of the left temporal and inferior parietal lobes (Silveri et al., 1997) and occasionally by individual patients with Alzheimer's disease (Gonnerman et al., 1997; Garrard et al., 1998) .
Perceptual versus associative knowledge and the living/non-living category-specific deficits There are two main theories with regard to the breakdown of semantic knowledge along the living/non-living distinction (although there are at least four others; see Discussion). The first of these is still, perhaps, the dominant and most influential, namely that the dissociation arises from a selective breakdown of perceptual compared to functional/associative knowledge. Warrington and Shallice (1984) were the first to suggest that living and non-living items require rather different types of information to distinguish one exemplar from another. They argued that man-made objects have 'clearly defined functions' and are primarily differentiated by their functional properties, whereas animals tend to have few functions and are distinguished in terms of their visual appearance. Consequently, to differentiate the two broad categories into their various exemplars, man-made items require detailed knowledge about function, whereas animate kinds need more perceptual information. If brain damage leads to a loss of perceptual knowledge, then living categories will tend to be affected more, or if there is degraded functional knowledge then the opposite dissociation should result. Warrington and Shallice suggested that a division along perceptual/functional lines was preferable to truly category-specific deficits as it gave an explanation for the odd categories of items that tend not to follow the living/ non-living distinction. For instance, Warrington and Shallice noted that their patients with relatively poor knowledge of animals were also impaired with respect to types of cloth and precious stone (which have only one generic function and are differentiated primarily by colour or texture) but not with respect to body parts (which have very different functions).
The hypothesis that a differential weighting of perceptual and associative/functional attributes underpins the dissociation between living and non-living kinds has been taken up by various authors. Farah and McClelland (1991) described a computational model of semantic memory in which living and non-living items were coded across differing numbers of visual or functional units. They demonstrated that category-specific deficits emerged after selective 'lesions' to either the visual or functional units, in line with Warrington and Shallice's original hypothesis. Other studies have supported the 'differential-weighting hypothesis' with the observation that the patients impaired for living categories tend to exhibit poor knowledge about visual but not functional/associative properties of items (e.g. De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1994) . Some patients demonstrate an interaction between category and attribute type resulting in relatively poor performance on tasks tapping visual knowledge about animate objects (Sartori and Job, 1988; Silveri and Gainotti, 1988; Farah et al., 1989; Hart and Gordon, 1992; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996; Forde et al., 1997) . For example, Gainotti and Silveri (Silveri and Gainotti, 1988; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) showed that their patient was significantly less likely to provide the appropriate label to a living thing than a man-made object when the verbal definition stressed perceptual attributes. If the definitions stressed functional information, there was no significant difference between categories (the patient was equally anomic for the animate and inanimate kinds). In a thorough analysis of patient SRB, Forde et al. (1997) gathered evidence favouring the hypothesis that SRB was impaired on any task that required fine perceptual differentiation. They showed that in addition to exhibiting a category-specific deficit for living things, SRB was also impaired when required to name faces and subordinate categories such as types of car. When asked to put names to definitions containing either functional-associative or visual-perceptual information, SRB was only impaired for the latter type. Another category-specific patient, DM (Humphreys et al., 1998) , has shown the same pattern. It is interesting to note that more detailed visual processing is required for living items both for normal subjects under brief presentation and in discrimination learning for monkeys (Gaffan and Heywood, 1993) .
In addition to the behavioural data in favour of the differential-weighting hypothesis, some authors have noted distinct neuroanatomical correlates (Saffran and Schwartz, 1994; Gainotti et al., 1995; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) . Category-specific deficits for living things tend to be associated with temporal lesions typically involving medial and inferior temporal areas, while the majority of deficits for man-made items co-occur with lesions to fronto-parietal regions (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983; Hillis et al., 1990; Sacchett and Humphreys, 1992; Breedin et al., 1994a) , although sometimes with temporal involvement as well McCarthy, 1987, 1994; Silveri et al., 1997) or just with temporal atrophy (Hillis and Caramazza, 1991; Tippett et al., 1996a) . These neural substrates are of particular interest because they coincide with the ventral and dorsal visual pathways (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982) . Thus, a lesion to the inferior temporal lobe should lead to impaired high-level visual processing and in turn, to relatively poor performance for animate kinds. approach see Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) . We would like to sound a note of warning with regard to the demonstration of an association between category-specific deficits and impaired perceptual knowledge. Not all patients with category-specific deficits for animate kinds exhibit a difference between perceptual and associative knowledge. Caramazza and Shelton (1998) have noted that more recent, tightly designed studies have not identified the association. For example, Laiacona et al. (1993) reported data from two patients with relatively impaired naming and comprehension of living things. The patients completed a semantic feature questionnaire that required access to perceptual and associative attributes of living and nonliving concepts. Both were equally impaired on the two attribute types although they still exhibited a significant category-specific effect overall (for very similar results, see Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Moss et al., 1998; Samson et al., 1998) . In their re-analysis of patient JBR (originally reported by Warrington and Shallice, 1984) , Funnell and De Mornay Davies (1996) also failed to find a difference between visual and associative knowledge on a semantic feature questionnaire. SB (Sheridan and Humphreys, 1993) , a patient who had suffered from HSVE, demonstrated relatively poor naming and comprehension of animals and foods in comparison to objects but did not show any difference between a test of visual knowledge and verbal-functional verification. Again, like Laiacona et al.'s patients, SB exhibited a significant category effect in both tasks (with normal performance for the objects). This negative result has lead Humphreys and colleagues (Sheridan and Humphreys, 1993; Humphreys et al., 1995 Humphreys et al., , 1998 Forde et al., 1997) to suggest that category-specific deficits can result from different functional loci (see also Gainotti et al., 1995) . We will turn to this possibility below (see Discussion). One of the most problematic observations for the differential-weighting hypothesis has been made by Laws et al. (1995) . They reported data collected from patient SE who, after recovering from HSVE, exhibited the characteristic deficit for animate kinds (and in this case very near normal levels of naming and comprehension for manmade items). However across a wide variety of tasks designed to tap associative-functional and visual knowledge, SE was significantly worse at retrieving associative than visual knowledge about animals and made few errors for manmade objects. [It should be noted that Moss et al. (1997) failed to replicate this pattern in SE. In stark contrast to Laws et al., they found evidence for a selective impairment for the visual properties of living things.]
If the comprehension and naming of animals is disproportionately reliant on visual knowledge or even on increased levels of perceptual processing (Humphreys et al., 1998) , then category-specific deficits should be present in naming from any modality. This has been shown in some patients (e.g. Forde et al., 1997) . Thus, the dissociation should hold for naming to definition, even if the descriptions contain functional information alone because the identification of animals, according to this theory, still requires access to perceptual knowledge. However, patient LA (Silveri and Gainotti, 1988; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) failed to show a category difference on naming to functional definition, while SRB (Forde et al., 1997) and DM (Humphreys et al., 1998) were able to name the items to functional definition (both animate and inanimate) as accurately as control subjects.
Part of the attraction of the differential-weighting hypothesis is that it provides a unified theory for both living and non-living dissociations. As far as we are aware, there has been no investigation of perceptual and associative knowledge in any of the ten cases showing category specific deficits for non-living kinds (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983 Hillis et al., 1990; Hillis and Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett and Humphreys, 1992; Breedin et al., 1994a; Silveri et al., 1997) or for patients with left anterior temporal lobectomy (Tippett et al., 1996a) . The predicted pattern should be the opposite of living-specific impairments, namely a deficit to functional-associative attribute knowledge particularly pronounced for manmade kinds. This hypothesis remains to be tested; some evidence related to the hypothesis will be presented in this paper.
Cognitive and psycholinguistic differences between living and non-living categories
An alternative hypothesis for the category-specific disorders is that they reflect the underlying cognitive and psycholinguistic properties of the concepts involved. For instance, animals, particularly foreign animals, tend to be rated as less familiar than non-living things, and their names are less frequent. This has lead some researchers to argue that many apparent category-specific deficits might be due to poor performance for relatively unfamiliar items (Funnell and Sheridan, 1992; Stewart et al., 1992; Howard et al., 1995; Tippett et al., 1996b) . This theory also explains the fact that many category-specific patients are also impaired for musical instruments, but not for body parts. Inspection of the familiarity ratings that accompany the Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture set (Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980) shows that musical instruments and foreign animals have some of the lowest familiarity ratings while body parts fall at the other end of the continuum. Funnell and De Mornay Davies (1996, pp. 469-470) noted that CW (Wilson et al., 1995) a category-specific HSVE patient who was a professional musician, demonstrated the characteristic deficit for living things, but his knowledge for the category of musical instrument was commensurate with that of other man-made objects.
There are now a number of reported cases in the literature that show a significant category effect over and above the influence of various cognitive and psycholinguistic variables (e.g. Farah et al., , 1996 Barbarotto et al., 1995; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996; Forde et al., 1997) , including the re-analysis of patient JBR by Funnell and De Mornay Davies (1996) . How many of the claims for category-specific deficits would remain in the literature if the studies had controlled for all the appropriate factors? As familiarity, frequency, etc., affect performance in many of these patients, these variables cannot be disregarded in future category-specific cases. In fact, Funnell and De Mornay Davies (1996) have argued that category-specific deficits for living things might still be explained in terms of familiarity if the variable included not only the frequency but also the quality of interaction with each item (consider for example the difference between the quality of our knowledge about the domestic cat versus that of a lion).
The standard line against the cognitive/psycholinguistic factor hypothesis is that it does not predict the opposite dissociation (e.g. Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Breedin et al., 1994a; Gainotti et al., 1995; Silveri et al., 1997) . The double dissociation only proves that the two patient groups are different in some respect, however. This might be the separation of living and non-living categories, although it could be the influence of two different sets of variables . For example, normal subjects' and aphasic individuals' speed and accuracy on a variety of lexical tasks are affected by the age at which people typically learn the word (Morrison et al., 1992 (Morrison et al., , 1997 Howard, 1994, 1995; Morrison and Ellis, 1995; Ellis et al., 1996; Lambon Ralph et al., 1998) . Age of acquisition (AoA) is generally lower for animals than objects Morrison et al., 1997) , so some patients might show better performance on animate kinds because they are relatively early-acquired items. Howard et al. show that with frequency-matched sets of animate and inanimate items, the animate items are also higher in imageability. Some of the reported animacy effects may be due to such confounds. If, for instance, patient A was strongly affected by familiarity and patient B by AoA or imageability, unmatched lists of living and non-living objects could appear to reveal a double dissociation between the two categories. It would be interesting to know if the patient with progressive left temporal atrophy reported by Silveri et al. (1997) with a categoryspecific naming deficit favouring animate kinds would still exhibit the small but significant difference if AoA and imageability were controlled for. Proper consideration of the influence of different variables might also lead to a greater number of non-living impaired case reports. If familiarity and frequency also affect these patients, a category-specific deficit for non-living items can be missed because the impairment is 'masked' by the influence of the cognitive and psycholinguistic variables.
DAT, semantic dementia and category-specificity
We have noted above the neuroanatomical correlates associated with the living/non-living dissociations (Saffran and Schwartz, 1994; Gainotti et al., 1995; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) . In particular, the category-specific living impairment seems to co-occur most often with medial and inferior temporal damage (Gainotti et al., 1995; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) , normally as a result of HSVE or CVA. We report below data from two patients, one with semantic dementia and the other with DAT. These two aetiologies are very interesting with regard to category-specific deficits. Dementia of Alzheimer's type is most often associated with a dense amnesia and at least a degree of semantic impairment (Hodges et al., 1990 (Hodges et al., , 1992b , which probably results from atrophy that appears first in medial temporal structures and then in the temporal neocortex itself (Braak and Braak, 1991; Garrard et al., 1998) . Given the close relationship between the patterns of atrophy seen in DAT and HSVE one might predict that category-specific deficits should be common in DAT patients. There have been a number of group studies that have tested this prediction. Some have found no evidence for a categoryspecific deficit (Hodges et al., 1992b . Others have found relatively poor performance for living things (Silveri et al., 1991; Montanes et al., 1995; Daum et al., 1996) . Tippett et al. (1996b) replicated this category effect only with a set of items that controlled for frequency and prototypicality (the items from Silveri et al., 1991) , but found no effect when two further lists were administered that also controlled for rated familiarity and visual complexity. Finally, one study has reported better classification of living than non-living kinds (Montanes et al., 1996) , although the same researchers had previously found better naming performance for non-living items (Montanes et al., 1995) . It is possible that these mixed findings reflect the underlying heterogeneity that occurs in DAT, as although a large number of patients present with amnesia and some semantic impairment, this is not always the case (e.g. Croot et al., 1996; Mackenzie Ross et al., 1996) . Using a caseseries approach, two studies have been able to identify a number of individual DAT patients with a category-specific naming deficit for living things and occasional patients with the reverse dissociation (Gonnerman et al., 1997; Garrard et al., 1998) , of whom one has come to autopsy showing biparietal involvement . In addition, there has been a single case study which revealed a significant category-specific deficit for animate objects in naming and visual knowledge tasks (Mauri et al., 1994) .
Semantic dementia, or progressive fluent aphasia (Hodges et al., 1992a; Snowden et al., 1989 ) is a disorder associated with progressive atrophy of the anterior temporal lobes, particularly of the inferior temporal gyrus. The atrophy typically involves the left side (Hodges et al., 1992a , although the disease eventually leads to bilateral damage . The progressive loss of temporal structures is associated with an inexorable loss of knowledge about the meanings of words, objects and concepts. The semantic deficit is present for all sensory modalities (Snowden et al., 1989; Hodges et al., 1992a) and is accompanied by a profound anomia. The majority of patients manifest features of surface dyslexia (although see Cipolotti and Warrington, 1995) . Despite sometimes severe semantic impairment, the patients perform well on tests of auditory-verbal short-term memory, non-verbal reasoning, perceptual and spatial skills, have good single-word phonology and syntax, and excellent day-to-day (episodic) memory (Snowden et al., 1989; Hodges et al., 1992a) , although recent research has shown relatively poor recall of events that occurred in the distant past (Graham and Hodges, 1997) .
We have already noted that previous studies have highlighted the role of inferior temporal structures in the processing of visual knowledge and the importance this might have in the representation of living kinds (e.g. Gainotti et al., 1995) . Most, if not all, of the published category-specific cases for living things have involved medial and neocortical temporal areas. Patients with semantic dementia rarely present with atrophy to medial temporal structures (Hodges et al., 1992a) , so they might be an ideal group of patients to test the apparent neuroanatomical correlation between poor knowledge of living things and atrophy to the inferior temporal region alone. There is growing evidence for the first part of the differential-weighting hypothesis, namely that damage to the inferior temporal lobes leads to poor visual knowledge. Patient TOB (McCarthy and Warrington, 1988; Parkin, 1993) seemed to produce definitions to spoken words, or circumlocutions to pictures that contained detailed functional knowledge with little sensory information. Detailed analyses of word and picture definitions provided by nine patients with semantic dementia have confirmed this pattern (Lambon Ralph et al., unpublished data) . Cardebat et al. (1996) reported that their patient was able to produce some semantic features regarding function but was unable to draw either animals or objects. Patient DM (Breedin et al., 1994b; Srinivas et al., 1997) exhibited a relative preservation of functional over perceptual attributes and a similar dissociation has been shown for patient NV (Basso et al., 1988) . Tyler and colleagues (Moss et al., 1995; Tyler and Moss, 1998) have found significant semantic priming for functional relationships but no priming for visual or category associations.
There is little evidence to suggest that this poor visual knowledge leads to category-specific effects, however, which is even more surprising given the numerous reports of frequency and familiarity effects in these patients (Hodges et al., 1992a Breedin et al., 1994b; Graham et al., 1994; Patterson et al., 1994; Cipolotti and Warrington, 1995; Funnell, 1995; Graham et al., 1995; Hirsh and Funnell, 1995; Lambon Ralph et al., 1998) . Cardebat et al. (1996) found a category effect both in naming and word-picture matching but it is unclear if the items were matched for any of the relevant cognitive and psycholinguistic variables. In a group study of nine patients, Hodges et al. (1998) found a significant category effect in word-to-picture matching (with items balanced for familiarity only) but not in naming-although it is unclear whether any individual patients showed a significant category effect. TOB (McCarthy and Warrington, 1988) was reported to have a category effect in verbal definition and NV (Basso et al., 1988) for verbal comprehension and naming, although in both papers the items were controlled for frequency alone. TOB's naming was assessed by Parkin (1993) , who found no category effect if the stimuli were controlled for frequency and familiarity. Breedin et al. (1994a,b) found a category-specific effect for DM's comprehension in favour of tools over animals (the items were matched for frequency). However, a closer look at the data reveals that DM was impaired on many other man-made categories (e.g. vehicles) and he only exhibited the effect in two out of the three administrations. In addition, on the visual versus associative attribute test referred to above (which was matched for frequency and familiarity), DM showed a significant difference between attribute type but no difference between living and non-living categories. In an analysis of the factors which predict naming accuracy in semantic dementia, Lambon Ralph et al. (1998) found consistent effects of frequency, familiarity, and AoA across the nine patients and for the group as a whole. Only one out of the nine demonstrated a significant effect of category over and above the influence of the other variables.
There is only one convincing report of a category-specific deficit in a case of semantic dementia (patient MF: Barbarotto et al., 1995) . In word-to-picture matching, naming and answering semantic attribute questions, MF exhibited significantly poorer performance for living categories even when other factors were accounted for (including familiarity, frequency and item difficulty). In fact, for the first two testing sessions in the longitudinal study, MF's scores for the non-living categories remained in the normal range [i.e. there was a classical dissociation (Shallice, 1988) between the two sets]. His drawing from memory also indicated a strong category effect. However, unlike many other semantic dementia patients, MF failed to show a significant difference between perceptual and associative knowledge on the semantic feature questionnaire. It may be relevant to note that MF was different to other reported cases of semantic dementia in that his temporal atrophy involved medial structures including the hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus, particularly on the right.
We present two cases studies. The data for these two patients are drawn from two rather unrelated programmes of research. Consequently, the patients have not been tested on exactly the same set of assessments. However, there is sufficient overlap between the two for powerful comparisons to be drawn. The first reports data collected from a patient, DB, with DAT who presented with a category-specific deficit for living items. This effect was significant over and above the influence of familiarity, frequency, visual complexity and AoA (amongst other variables). On tasks designed to assess her associative and perceptual knowledge, however, DB exhibited no difference with regard to attribute type but a consistent category effect alone. The second case, IW, was a patient with semantic dementia resulting from progressive atrophy of her left temporal lobe, including inferior temporal structures. She demonstrated a clear deficit for perceptual over associative knowledge but in fact, her comprehension and naming were significantly better for living categories. Thus DB and IW form two dissociations: the first being a double dissociation between living and non-living categories; the second between a category-specific deficit for living things without differential attribute knowledge on the one hand, and differential knowledge without a living thing impairment (in fact the opposite) on the other.
Case study 1: DB-category-specific impairment without differential attribute knowledge Background DB, a right-handed woman, was born in 1910. During her working life, she was employed in a variety of part-time domestic posts while she brought up her four children. She presented in 1993 with a severe recent memory deficit, poor long-term memory, repetitious conversation and a degree of anomia. Given the pattern of impairment, a diagnosis of dementia of Alzheimer's type (DAT) was made. An MRI scan (see Fig. 1 ) revealed generalized cortical atrophy, including the temporal neocortex and particularly to medial temporal structures bilaterally. Unfortunately, due to movement artefacts, we were unable to obtain precise coronal sections and thus detailed analyses of the temporal neocortex are impossible.
Although we have been studying DB longitudinally since May 1995, our experimental investigation with regard to her category-specific impairment was conducted between October and December 1996. Her profound amnesia was very apparent: she would repeat the same stories/ conversation within 5 min of each other, was unable to remember when she had last been visited, what testing had been done, and so on. Her poor memory was confirmed by her scores on the Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984) . She scored 30/50 on the faces (no better than chance) and 35/50 on the words (5th percentile) DB was disorientated in time and place. She achieved 21/30 on the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein et al., 1975) . Her forward digit span was five. Her category fluency was also impoverished (DB produced a total of 40 items across eight categories; normal controls achieve a mean of 113.7 items; SD 19.4). DB exhibited a mild impairment on a synonym judgement task (Franklin et al., 1992) , both for concrete (37/50: control range 38-40) and abstract words (35/40: control range 37-40). Her score of 39/52 on the all-picture version of the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (Howard and Patterson, 1992) was outside the normal range (0-3 errors). DB's spontaneous speech was fluent with only occasional word-finding errors. Her anomia was much more apparent in naming to confrontation. The vast majority of her errors were semantic and they seemed to occur most often to the animate pictures (see below). Our detailed analysis of this apparent category-specific deficit is reported in the next two sub-sections.
Object recognition and comprehension
DB's impaired comprehension (on synonym judgement and the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test) has already been noted above. Table 1 shows her results on a variety of tests involving picture stimuli. DB's performance was outside the normal range on all the tests except for the two requiring the subject to match a picture from two different view-points (minimal feature and foreshortened matching, Riddoch and Humphreys, 1992 ). DB's ability to identify the silhouette of a real object (VOSP silhouettes; Warrington and James, 1991) or pick out the real item from an array of nonsense silhouettes (VOSP object decision; Warrington and James, 1991) was impaired. Her score for silhouette identification was significantly lower for the animate than the inanimate items [ 2 (1) 6.7, P = 0.01]. She was also impaired in object decision when required to sort real from chimerical objects and animals (Riddoch and Humphreys, 1992; Graham, 1993) . In these tests, DB typically rejected the correct pictures suggesting that someone had drawn extra parts on another animal (e.g. to the picture of a deer, DB indicated that someone had 'stuck things' on a 'horse's' head, or that a picture of a zebra was a 'horse' with the 'wrong colours'). Her score on the TOAD (Graham, 1993) was significantly worse for the animals than the objects [ 2 (1) 7.44, P = 0.006]. Note the stimuli in these tests are not controlled for any cognitive psycholinguistic factors.
The within-category word-picture matching tests (Lambon involve 100 trials, each containing the target picture together with four category co-ordinate items (e.g., a goat is presented with donkey, deer, horse and cow). DB's scores for the written and spoken versions were both outside the normal elderly range and were significantly worse on the living than non-living items [spoken: 2 (1) = 9.1, P = 0.003; written:
2 (1) = 9.8, P = 0.002]. In order to ensure that the category effect was not due to the influence of any potential confounding factors, DB's word-picture matching accuracy (including responses from written and spoken for items that have values on the various cognitive-psycholinguistic variables) was entered into a simultaneous logistic regression along with category, AoA, object familiarity, imageability, phoneme length, (log) spoken frequency (from the Celex Database, 1993) and visual complexity. Category was the only factor to have a significant independent effect on DB's comprehension score (Wald = 4.05, P = 0.04). 
Naming to confrontation
Three naming tests were administered. In the first, DB was asked to name 219 simple line drawings which have values on various psycholinguistic variables (taken from Morrison et al., 1997) . She correctly named 49/84 (58%) of the living items and 110/135 (81%) of the man-made objects [a significant difference:
2 (1)=13.9, P < 0.001]. Her predominant error type was semantic, including superordinate [e.g., pineapple<'some sort of fruit', snail<'a creature', owl< 'a bird'] and category co-ordinate responses [gorilla< 'monkey', ladybird<'fly', goat<'kangaroo', tiger<'lion', lion<'sheep']. The category effect was assessed against the influence of any potential confounding factors by entering DB's naming accuracy into a simultaneous logistic regression along with category, AoA, object familiarity, imageability, phoneme length, (log) spoken frequency (from the Celex Database, 1993) and visual complexity. Category (Wald = 5.33, P = 0.02) AoA (Wald = 4.98, P = 0.03) and object familiarity (Wald = 10.6, P = 0.001) were all found to have significant independent effects on DB's naming accuracy (no other variables reached significance).
The second naming test was taken from Gainotti and Silveri (1996) . It contains items matched pairwise for familiarity and frequency. The results are shown in Table 2 .
Again the majority of DB's errors were semantic in nature (15 semantic: e.g. eagle<'pigeon', fly<'wasp', tomato<'apple'; one no response; one visual error: flute<'curtain rail') DB's scores were significantly better for man-made than living items [ 2 (1) = 9.9, P = 0.002] and were higher on the more familiar items [ 2 (1) = 6.6, P = 0.01]. If the sets are split into low and high familiarity groups (at the median value), the animacy effect was particularly pronounced in the low familiarity set [low familiarity:
2 (1)=11.0, P = 0.001; high familiarity: 2 (1) < 1, n.s.]. When the interaction is analysed using an exact text for the homogeneity of odds ratios (Zelen, 1971; Mehta and Patel, 1995) , the null hypothesis (of equal odds ratios for the effect of animacy in the high and low familiarity set) cannot be rejected (exact P = 0.36), although there is a significant effect of category overall (odds ratio = 9.98, P = 0.001). Two observations are worthy of note. First, like patients LA (Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) and JBR (Funnell and De Mornay Davies, 1996) , DB's category effect seemed to be most pronounced for the low familiarity group (although the interaction, at least for DB, was not significant). Second, the three errors DB made to man-made objects were all to musical instruments (flute<'curtain rail', trumpet<'musical instrument to blow through' and guitar<'violin').
The third naming test was constructed from a subset of the 219 items used in the first naming task. Thirty-two animals and the same number of man-made objects (no musical instrument) were matched pairwise for object familiarity, spoken frequency (natural and log values), phoneme length and imageability. The items were split at the median familiarity value (low: 1.55-2.57; high 2.59-4.09). The results are shown in Table 3. DB's errors were nearly all semantic (15/16: e.g. camel<'animal', gorilla<'monkey', bat<'butterfly', whale<'fish'). The one exception was a circumlocution to the picture of a tractor. Her scores were very similar to those found in the previous matched naming test. DB's If the data are split at the median familiarity value, the animacy effect was only significant in the low familiarity set [low:
2 (1) = 6.8, P = 0.009; high: 2 (1) < 1, n.s.], although, again, the interaction was not significant (test for the homogeneity of odds ratio, exact P = 1.0; odds ratio for category overall = 6.91, P = 0.004).
Tests of visual and associative knowledge DB's comprehension and naming was significantly worse for living than non-living kinds, even when the effect of various factors was taken into account. Given her categoryspecific deficit, did DB exhibit differential loss of perceptual over associative-functional knowledge? The next section documents the results of various assessments designed to test this hypothesis.
DB was asked to name 40 simple line drawings and to indicate (from a choice of ten) the correct colour (Graham, 1995) . DB named 27/40 correctly (all errors were semantic: e.g., tomato<'apple', crocodile<'fish'), but her ability to identify the correct colour was even worse, 18/40 correct (normal control mean = 34.8, SD = 2.4; from Graham, 1995) . DB's poor performance on object decision, silhouette recognition and colour matching could be taken as evidence of poor visual processing and thus her category-specific deficit would be unsurprising. However, in other tasks where visual and non-visual attribute knowledge is compared, DB failed to demonstrate the difference that is predicted by the differential-weighting hypothesis (she appeared to be equally impaired on both types of knowledge).
DB was given three tests designed to tap knowledge of associative-functional and perceptual knowledge of living and non-living things. The first was a revised version of a naming to definition task (Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) . Rather than requiring an anomic patient to name perceptual or associative definitions, DB was presented with a written definition (which was also read aloud to her) together with five written names, the target plus four 'semantic' foils (the names of other target items within the same living or non-living domain). DB was required to pick the name which best matched the description. The test retained the same items as the original version but the definitions were redrafted so that only perceptual or associative attributes were included within the relevant descriptions (the definitions, targets and foils are shown in Appendix 1). It might be suggested that DB's poor performance on the animate items was due to a confound with familiarity, or that IW's poor matching by visual description might be an accentuation of a normal effect. Clearly this test would be better if it contained equal numbers of living and non-living things, matched pairwise for all the relevant factors (instead, we opted to use the same target items as those used previously by Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) . If the data from DB and IW are considered together, however, it seems unlikely that DB's poor performance is solely due to the effect of familiarity (IW's performance in general was strongly affected by familiarity), while if visual knowledge is relatively harder for normal subjects, we would have expected to see poor matching by visual description for both IW and DB. DB's scores are shown in Table 4 . She was able to match definitions to names for all 24 non-living items but could only manage 69% for the animals [a significant difference:
2 (1) = 7.1, P = 0.008]. There was no effect of definition type on her performance.
DB was asked to complete two semantic feature questionnaires. The first includes four perceptual (yes/no) questions and four associative questions for each of 48 items (24 living, 24 non-living, see Hodges et al., 1992a) . The second set was constructed along identical lines, but included the 64 matched items used previously to test DB's naming to confrontation (see Table 3 ).
DB's mean score per item (and standard deviation) for the two tasks are shown in Tables 5 and 6 . On the items from Hodges et al. (1992) , DB exhibited a main effect of attribute type [F(1,46) = 5.7, P = 0.02], category [F(1,46) = 6.3, P = 0.02] and an interaction [F(1,46) = 7.0, P = 0.01], which was due not to poor perceptual information about animals but to relatively good knowledge of the associative information about artefacts. This result may be due, at least in part, to the unbalanced nature of the 48 items (the mean object familiarity of the 24 living was 2.28, versus 3.25 for the 24 artefacts, even though it includes six musical instruments). On the 64 matched-item set, DB demonstrated significantly better performance on the man-made items [category: F(1,60) = 10.6, P = 0.002] but no effect of attribute type [F(1,60) = 2.4, P = 0.13] nor any interaction [F(1.60) < 1].
To test DB's visual knowledge further, we asked her to draw each of the 64 matched-item set under three different conditions: immediate copy (with target present) delayed copy and drawing from memory. The delayed copying technique has been used before (Franklin et al., 1987) with a patient who was suffering from semantic dementia. Copying a picture after a delay should require the subject to use semantic as well as 'visual' memory. Consequently, any impairment to semantic knowledge should be highlighted in this task (presumably it will be most sensitive to the status of visual semantic attributes). In the delayed copying condition, DB was asked to draw the target picture after it had been removed from sight (she had been given an unlimited time to study the picture). For this patient, no delay was required before seeing a deterioration in her drawing output (perhaps because of her dense amnesia), although other patients may required a specific delay (see patient IW below). If the three conditions are administered together, a number of methodological problems can be overcome. The immediate copying provides a baseline against which the other conditions can be measured (e.g., poor draughtsmanship). Drawing from memory requires the subject both to understand the spoken label and then to produce a picture. Delayed-copying on the other hand requires no verbal input or output (and thus one should be able to eliminate the effects of poor verbal comprehension on impoverished drawings from memory).
Five example drawings from each of the conditions are shown in Fig. 2 . DB's immediate copies were the best, while the delayed copying revealed a clear impairment which was enhanced when DB was required to draw from memory. Fifteen naïve subjects were asked to rate, on a scale of 0-6, how good a representation of the intended target the picture was (the raters were unaware of which condition the picture came from and only rated a picture in one of the three conditions-thus each picture was rated by five subjects per condition).
The deterioration across conditions was confirmed by these ratings (see Table 7 ). A three by two split-plot ANOVA confirmed a main effect of drawing condition [F(1,120) = 146.5, P < 0.001] but there was no effect of category [F(1,60) < 1] and no interaction [F(1,60) < 1]. Each pairwise comparison between drawing conditions was significant [immediate versus delayed copying: t = 13.1, P < 0.001; delayed copying versus drawing from memory: t = 2.6, P = 0.01; immediate copying versus drawing from memory: t = 15.2, P < 0.001].
Although there was no category effect present in the rated accuracy of DB's pictures, there were qualitative differences between the categories. The majority of the animal targets (29/32) were drawn as a though the whole category had 'regressed to the mean', i.e. these items were drawn with the outline of a highly familiar prototype such as a cat, dog or horse (see Fig. 3 ). This 'prototype effect' included a number of items that have either two or no legs [e.g. duck and whale-for the picture of a whale DB commented, 'four legs, so it can get out (of the water)']. For the remaining items DB produced a semantic drawing error (e.g., bat<'bird', ladybird<'fly', caterpillar<'worm'). The artefacts were impoverished but were drawn with quite Range of scores per item = 0-6. different features. We shall return to this observation below (see Discussion). The final test administered required DB to give verbal definitions for each member of the 64 matched-item set. DB was encouraged to give as much information about each item as she could. When she failed to produce information about a certain aspect of the target concept (e.g. what it looked like), she was given various probe questions including associative-functional and perceptual queries (e.g. where is it from?, does it walk, fly or swim?, how many legs does it have?, what colour is it?, what does it eat?, where is it found?, who uses it?, what is its purpose?). The definitions (a combination of her spontaneous production and responses to specific questions) were analysed in two ways. First, five independent subjects were asked to rate the quality of each definition on the same scale as that used for the pictures. The mean (and standard deviation) rating is shown in Table 8 . DB's definitions received higher ratings for the artefacts than for the animals [category:
F(1,60) = 7.9, P = 0.007] and for the more familiar kinds [F(1,60) = 6.2, P = 0.02]. The interaction between these two factors was not significant [F(1,60) < 1].
In addition, for each item the number of perceptual and associative-functional attributes produced by DB were counted. These were split into correct and intrusive (incorrect) features. The mean number per item is shown in Table 9 .
DB produced more correct information for animals than artefacts [category: F(1,60) = 3.8, P = 0.05]. There was no main effect of attribute type [F(1,60) < 1], although there was a significant interaction between category and attribute type [F(1,60) = 11.6, P < 0.001], which was due to DB producing the most information for the visual characteristics of animals. This is surprising, perhaps, given her deficit for living things on all other tasks. It is possible that normal subjects might produce even more visual information for animals in their definitions and so, by comparison, DB would have a selective deficits for the animate items. DB also gave more intrusive information for animals than artefacts [category: F(1,60) = 24.4, P < 0.001] and produced a greater number of visual attribute intrusions [attribute: F(1,60) = 12.9, P = 0.001], particularly for the animate items [attribute category: F(1,60) = 7.4, P = 0.008]. The accuracy ratings from the independent subjects appeared to be sensitive to both correct (correlation between rated accuracy and number of correct features per item; r = 0.37, P = 0.003) and intrusive information (correlation between rated accuracy and number of intrusions per item; r = 0.53, P < 0.001).
Summary DB, a patient with DAT, presented with a category-specific naming and comprehension deficit for living things. The category effect was found to be significant over and above the effects of other cognitive-psycholinguistic variables, including familiarity, frequency, visual complexity and age-of-acquisition (AoA). The differential-weighting hypothesis predicts a greater loss of perceptual than associative-functional information. This hypothesis was not supported by DB's data. DB's performance on various tasks designed to tap specific properties was significantly worse for living than non-living items, but the assessments failed to find a difference between perceptual and associative-functional attribute knowledge.
Case study 2: IW-greater loss of perceptual than attribute knowledge with a category-specific impairment for man-made objects Background IW, a right-handed female (although she had always written with her left hand) was born in 1941. She had been employed in a variety of retail companies including managing a successful florist's in London. IW presented in 1994 after a year or two of 'poor memory'. Medical examination at that time noted considerable word-finding difficulties for both common objects and people's names. A MRI scan revealed significant localized atrophy of the left temporal lobe. Speech therapy assessment confirmed IW's expressive dysphasia but also noted an auditory comprehension deficit together with a degree of surface dyslexia and dysgraphia. Our investigation began in 1996. A MRI scan taken at this time showed significant atrophy of the left temporal lobe, most pronounced at the pole, which included significant reduction of the inferior temporal gyrus. IW's right temporal lobe and other cortical structures, including the medial temporal area, appeared to be intact (see Fig. 4 ).
IW's neuropsychological profile is summarized in Table  10 . The pattern matches that of semantic dementia (see Introduction). IW was profoundly anomic and had a semantic impairment when measured from any modality. IW's comprehension of words was significantly worse than that of pictures. The modality difference has been noted in other patients with semantic dementia (McCarthy and Warrington, 1988; M.A. Lambon Ralph et al., unpublished data) . Our detailed investigation of the nature of this difference is beyond the scope of the present article but it will be the subject of a future paper.
Although not disorientated in time or place, she scored poorly on the MMSE (22/30) (Folstein et al., 1975) because of her expressive and receptive language deficits. She was a surface dyslexic (better reading of words with regular than exceptional spelling-to-sound correspondences). Her single word phonology and syntax were relatively well preserved, as were her non-verbal, perceptual and spatial skills. Like other patients with semantic dementia, IW's day-to-day memory was extremely good. Our initial assessment also highlighted an apparent dissociation between visual and associative knowledge (relatively poor recall of visual information). The formal investigation of this dissociation is reported in the next section.
Tests of visual and associative knowledge IW was given the same colour matching test (from Graham, 1995) as DB. She named 13/40 of the items correctly (her predominant error type were no response and attempted circumlocutions) and indicated the correct colour for 27/40 (normal control mean = 34.8, SD = 2.4; from Graham, 1995) . IW's performance was very similar to that found by Graham (1995) in three other patients with semantic dementia. Category-specific deficits 323 IW's scores on the definition to word matching task, that contrasts perceptual and associative definitions, are shown in Table 11 . IW was significantly better when matching associative than perceptual definitions to words (binomial, P = 0.02). Despite showing poorer performance on the perceptual definitions, she was actually slightly better for the animals than artefact items (although the difference failed to reach significance).
IW's performance on the Hodges et al. (1992a) semantic feature questions is shown in Table 12 . IW was significantly better when answering the associative than perceptual questions [F(1,46) = 7.6, P = 0.008] but there was no effect of category [F(1,46) = 1.4, P = 0.24] and her marginally better performance for the associative questions about the artefacts approached significance [interaction: F(1,46) = 3.6, P = 0.06].
During the course of a wide variety of testing, IW was asked to give a definition to 50 spoken words that contained 15 animals and 35 man-made objects. Like DB, IW was given various prompting questions that included probes for perceptual and associative-functional knowledge. The mean number of each attribute per item is given in Table 13a . Although IW only gave small amounts of information, she nevertheless provided a significantly greater number of associative than perceptual attributes [F(1,48) = 45.5, P < 0.001], but was unaffected by category [F(1,48) = 1.1, n.s.] and did not exhibit an interaction [F(1,48) < 1]. IW's poor verbal comprehension has already been noted, and in this test, involving the definition of spoken words, she said that she had no idea what a word meant on 12 trials-1/15 trials with animate items, and 11/35 trials with artefacts. Table 13b shows the mean number of attributes given per item only for those words for which IW gave at least some information. The pattern is unchanged: a significant effect of attribute in favour of associative information [F(1,34) = 77.8, P < 0.001] but no effect of category [F(1,34) < 1] or an interaction [F(1,34) < 1]. Unlike DB, IW produced very little intrusive information.
IW was asked to draw two sets of items (n = 50 and n = 64) from memory. In order to assist the comprehension of the spoken name, each item was accompanied by an associative description (resulting in a drawing for all but three items). Some example drawings are shown in Fig. 5 . IW's drawings did not exhibit the same prototypical effect as demonstrated by DB, rather her pictures tended to miss out features. Interestingly, in both definition and drawing tasks IW would complain that she could not either 'visualize' the word or 'remember' a part of an item (for drawing). In order to assess whether IW did omit common features, four aged-matched controls were asked to sketch in < 1 min, each of the 114 pictures. Two judges used these pictures to create a list of features that were included by all, or nearly all, the control subjects (up to four features per Maximum score per item = 4. picture) despite the wide variability in their drawing skill. This scoring scheme was then applied to IW's drawings from memory. In the first set the normal subjects produced 178-183 of the 186 features (96-98%). IW only produced 107 (58%). The same pattern was found on the second set: normals produced 228-231 of the 236 items (97-98%), while IW produced 119 (50%). Unfortunately, IW was only given a limited number of items to copy after a delay. A few examples are shown in Fig. 6 . Unlike DB, IW required up to a minute delay before her poor visual knowledge began to influence her delayed copying. However, a similar pattern to that observed in her drawing from memory emerged. Rather than sketching very similar pictures of the animals (as in DB's prototypical drawings), IW's pictures demonstrated a loss of visual features. We shall return to this difference between the two subjects and their different performance on the definition task below (see Discussion).
Object recognition
IW was given a number of object recognition tests (the majority of which DB had also completed, see Table 1 ) the results of which are shown in Table 14 .
Despite her poor visual knowledge in the drawing and definition tasks described above, IW completed all the object recognition assessments achieving in each case scores slightly above the mean for control subjects. To test her object recognition even further, IW was given the Head's test (Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987) in which the subject is required to match the correct head (from four alternative) to the target body. IW completed this test without error. In an attempt to make the most sensitive object decision task possible, IW's typical drawing omission errors were used (after redrawing) as the foil in a two-alternative forcedchoice object decision test (an example is shown in Fig. 7 ). IW's performance was as good as university postgraduate subjects.
Although not the focus of our paper, it is interesting to note IW's excellent object decision performance despite her poor knowledge of visual attributes. This finding runs counter to the hypothesis that object decision is solely reliant on the integrity of centrally stored 'semantic' knowledge. It is, however, consistent with the hypothesis that the processes involved with object decision interact with semantic information such that object decision performance declines when there is more severe semantic impairment (see also Hodges et al., 1992a) . Other authors have suggested that object recognition can be dissociated entirely from semantic knowledge (Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987) , even in cases of semantic dementia (for a detailed analysis of this issue in a patient with semantic dementia, see Srinivas et al., 1997) . We will be able to assess these two competing theories as IW's visual knowledge deteriorates over time. 
Assessment of category-specificity in naming and comprehension
The differential-weighting hypothesis predicts that, given the differential loss of visual knowledge exhibited by IW, a category-specific deficit should result. This hypothesis was tested and the results are shown in the next section.
IW's naming was initially assessed using the same 219 picture set as that administered to DB. She only managed to name 85 items (39%) correctly. When she could not name the target picture she tried to give a circumlocution (54%) or indicated that she could not 'remember' the name (31%). IW also produced a small number of semantic errors (15%: e.g., knife<'butter', cabbage<'vegetable', glove< 'handbag'). IW's naming accuracy was compared to the same seven variables used in the analysis of DB's naming (category, objective AoA, object familiarity, imageability, phoneme length, (log) spoken frequency and visual complexity). There were significant simple correlations between IW's naming and all the variables except imageability and, interestingly, category. In order to assess the independent effects of each variable, the items and predictors were entered into a simultaneous logistic regression (as with DB). The regression revealed significant independent effects of object familiarity (Wald = 22.1, P < 0.0001), (log) frequency (Wald = 6.66, P = 0.01), AoA (Wald = 12.6. P = 0.0004) and better naming of living than non-living objects (Wald = 4.57, P = 0.03). The difference between the simple correlations and regression results highlights the importance of controlling for psycholinguistic factors even in cases with a category-specific deficit for man-made items (see Introduction). IW appeared to have no category-specific deficit in the simple correlations because familiarity and frequency also affected her naming. These two variables tend to favour man-made items, thus masking the category-specific deficit (note that patients that are affected by familiarity and frequency but do not have a category-specific deficit can show a significant simple correlation between naming and category in favour of non-living items which is removed once familiarity and frequency is controlled for; see Howard et al., 1995; Nickels and Howard, 1995) .
During the course of our study, IW has been given a number of naming to confrontation tests. In order to investigate further the factors that influence her naming accuracy we carried out simultaneous logistic regression analyses for each individual test and a meta-analysis of the entire naming corpus (965 naming attempts to the 765 items in six different tests). The analyses only included items for which values were available on the following factors: frequency (Celex count), length, rated AoA, rated word familiarity, rated imageability and animacy (reducing the original set to 777 naming attempts to 313 different items). The results with regard to the difference between living and non-living sets are shown in Table 15 .
Across the six tests, IW failed to show a significant difference between animate and inanimate pictures on three occasions and on the remainder demonstrated better naming performance for the animate sets. When the items were combined into a meta-analysis, IW's naming was found to be significantly better for the living pictures. In addition, IW exhibited significant independent effects of object familiarity, frequency, reverse length (better naming of pictures with longer names) and AoA. If objective AoA was substituted for rated AoA, and if visual complexity was taken into account, the results did not alter.
IW's comprehension was tested using the withincategory word-picture matching task (Lambon Ralph, 1997) described before for DB. IW scored 82/100 on the spoken version and 84/100 on the written (normal controls: 96-100). A simultaneous logistic regression analysis of the factors that predicted her combined word-picture matching performance (including the same factors as for DB) revealed significant independent effects of (log) frequency (Wald = 5.8, P = 0.02) visual complexity (Wald = 5.3, P = 0.02) and a trend in favour of pictures with longer names (Wald = 3.4, P = 0.07). There was no effect of category (Wald = 1.6, n.s.).
IW's comprehension and naming performance was assessed, in more detail, across a set of 30 animate items and 30 artefacts (matched as far as possible for imageability, concreteness, length, frequency, operativity, familiarity and rated AoA). On separate occasions IW was asked to define the spoken or written name and to name the picture (task was counterbalanced across the three sessions). The whole procedure was repeated 6 months later. IW's production was scored correct if she named the picture or if item-specific semantic information was offered in her definition. The basic data are shown in Table 16 .
The effect of category was assessed for the three tasks using simultaneous logistic regression analyses containing phoneme length, (log) frequency, familiarity, imageability, rated AoA, category, and task. IW's overall performance was significantly affected by phoneme length (in favour of longer words: P = 0.001), (log) frequency (P < 0.001), familiarity (P = 0.002), imageability (P = 0.007), rated AoA (P = 0.001) and category (in favour of the animate 
Summary
IW was a patient with semantic dementia resulting from profound atrophy of her left temporal lobe, most pronounced at the temporal pole. Detailed assessments revealed a greater loss of visual than associative-functional knowledge. Despite this dissociation, IW did not exhibit the predicted category-specific loss for animate things. In contrast, IW demonstrated better performance on living kinds than on artefacts in the majority of comprehension and naming assessments.
Discussion
We have reported data from two patients. DB, a woman with dementia of Alzheimer's type, presented with a category-specific impairment for living things in object decision, comprehension and naming tasks. Her knowledge of perceptual and associative attributes about living and non-living exemplars was assessed by two semantic feature questionnaires, a definition to word matching task and by verbal definition (with prompting for visual and associative information). DB did not shown any difference between attribute type but nevertheless was worse at retrieving information in general about living items. IW presented with semantic dementia. Her knowledge of visual attributes was significantly worse than her associative-functional information. Despite this differential loss of visual attribute knowledge, IW did not show a category-specific deficit for animate kinds. Rather, her naming and comprehension favoured the living things. In addition her ability to distinguish between real and chimeric pictures (object decision) was preserved. Therefore, the two patients form two important contrasts. The first is a double dissociation between the living and non-living categories themselves: DB was significantly worse at naming and understanding living things compared to non-living items, while IW was significantly better at naming and understanding living concepts. The other contrast is between the relationship between specific-perceptual attribute loss and a categoryspecific deficit for animate things: DB showed no difference in her ability to access perceptual and functional attributes, but did show a category-specific impairment for living things, while IW, who performed poorly with perceptual attribute judgements, did not show a category-specific deficit for living things-in fact the reverse. We would argue that the two patients are not just an interesting pair of single case studies that might have arisen from very unusual patterns of brain damage or premorbid organization, but rather they show patterns of impairment similar to other patients who have been reported before. There are other patients of different aetiology, who like DB exhibit a category specific deficit for animate things that do not demonstrate a specific difference between attribute types (Laiacona et al., 1993; Barbarotto et al., 1995; Funnell and De Mornay Davies, 1996) . IW resembles the pattern shown by the majority of patients with semantic dementia, not only in terms of her overall neuropsychological profile but also in the way that her semantic impairment seems to affect visual knowledge much more than associative-functional information (Basso et al., 1988; Breedin et al., 1994b; Moss et al., 1995; Cardebat et al., 1996; Srinivas et al., 1997; Tyler and Moss, 1998; Lambon Ralph et al., unpublished data) . Nevertheless, only one patient with semantic dementia has been reported with a specific impairment in understanding and producing the names of animate items (that also has appropriate control of cognitive-psycholinguistic factors). This is the case reported by Barbarotto et al. (1995) , who was exceptional for at least three reasons-he demonstrated a clear (classical) category-specific dissociation but he showed no significant difference between attribute type and he presented with medial and neocortical damage (see below). We believe that these data are critical for some of the existing explanations for category-specific deficits. We shall consider a number of them below. The differential-weighting hypothesis
We reviewed the 'differential-weighting' hypothesis in the Introduction. This hypothesis covers those theories that emphasize the importance of certain attribute types for the differentiation between exemplars within a category. Warrington and Shallice (1984) , amongst others (Farah and McClelland, 1991; , have suggested that living things are primarily differentiated by how they look whereas man-made objects tend to have specific functions. Consequently, impaired knowledge of visual or associative information should lead to animate or inanimate deficits, respectively. DB and patients like her (Laiacona et al., 1993 (Laiacona et al., , 1997 Sheridan and Humphreys, 1993; Barbarotto et al., 1995 Barbarotto et al., , 1996 Funnell and De Mornay Davies, 1996; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Moss et al., 1998; Samson et al., 1998) indicate that a category-specific impairment for living kinds does not necessarily have to be associated with relatively poor perceptual knowledge. Conversely, IW's data would seem to suggest that a differential loss of visual attributes does not always lead to poor comprehension and naming of living things. As far as we are aware IW, a patient with relatively better performance on living things, is the only case reported to date for which different attribute knowledge has been investigated. Of course, the results she provides are the opposite to those predicted by the differential-weighting hypothesis. When the two patterns, represented by DB and IW, are taken together the result would appear to be problematic for the differentialweighting hypothesis. It could be argued that DB's null effect for attribute type could be due to insensitivity within the test materials/ procedures. However, the same materials were used with IW, who did exhibit a dissociation. In addition, it is possible that IW might exhibit a category-specific deficit for animate things after further deterioration of her visual knowledge, i.e. the current impairment was insufficient to cause a category-specific effect. This is a hypothesis that we should be able to test as we study IW's deterioration over time. We believe that it is unlikely, however, as there are a number of other semantic dementia patients with much greater semantic impairments that do not show a category effect (Lambon Ralph et al., 1998) .
The influence of cognitive and psycholinguistic variables
Although our patients' performance was affected by a number of psycholinguistic variables, including frequency and familiarity, the influence of category was significant over and above these other factors. In fact, for one list of items, IW's category effect was not observed until the other factors had been partialled out. This highlights the importance of controlling for the influence of psycholinguistic variables in category-specific cases of living and non-living types. Although familiarity and various other variables do not provide a sufficient explanation for all the categoryspecific cases, it would appear that familiarity plays an important role (and is probably a contributing factor to the apparent imbalance in the occurrence of cases, with many more reports of specific deficits for living things than the reverse). Funnell and De Mornay Davis (1996) have argued that a variety of rated familiarity (one that included a measure of the quality as well as number of interactions with each object) might prove sufficient for the entire category-specific effect. Although we have some sympathy with this notion (consider the difference between our knowledge of a domestic dog and a jackal), it is possible that normal subjects do include both quality and frequency of interaction within their ratings (for further discussion of the factors that might load onto familiarity ratings see Lambon Ralph et al., 1998) .
Self-organizing semantic networks
An alternative explanation for category-specific deficits can be found within distributed models of semantic memory. For example, Ritter and Kohonen (1989) have demonstrated that a self-organizing topographical network can form areas within the two-dimensional semantic 'space' which respond maximally to certain items and categories (even though category is not explicitly encoded in the semantic feature input). It is not a large conceptual step to suggest that if damage was relatively localized the result could be critical for a specific category of items. It is possible that the same result could be achieved from other distributed architectures (e.g. Plaut and Shallice, 1993; Small et al., 1995) . Although the representations are formed in a multi-dimensional hyperspace, items from the same category are encoded with relatively similar semantic features so that the individual concept attractors are clustered within the same area of semantic space (see Plaut and Shallice, 1993) . If damage occurs to a selection of hidden units that is preferentially dominant in the formation of an area of semantic space then a categoryspecific deficit could result. This does not mean that certain categories are 'in' a specific set of hidden units (or by extension the neural substrates they are analogous to) rather this hypothesis suggests that all the units are involved in the formation of each concept but the correct activation of a subset is critical for differentiation within certain categories.
This proposal requires lesioning of a very circumscribed collection of units for a category-specific deficit to arise which is likely to be a relatively rare event. This would seem to fit with the observation that of the many patients with a semantic impairment few seem to present with a categoryspecific breakdown (see below). However the brain damage that occurs in category-specific cases is often widespread (e.g. consider the extent of atrophy that occurs in HSVE) and this is not easily reconciled with the notion of very discrete areas of damage within the simulated models. Another drawback is that the theory makes no clear predictions with regard to which patients and under what circumstances a category-specific deficit should arise. Consequently, this hypothesis is little more than a description of the data and not a falsifiable theory.
Intercorrelation amongst features
A number of recent articles have emphasized the importance of intercorrelations amongst individual semantic features (e.g. Gonnerman et al., 1997; McRae et al., 1997; Moss et al., 1998) . McRae et al. (1997) have shown that normal subjects are quicker to confirm or reject attributes if they are highly correlated with other features (that is these features tend to co-occur in the formation of individual concepts). From a statistical analysis of the features that make up 190 different concepts, McRae et al. found that there was a much higher intercorrelation between the features of living things than artefacts. Gonnerman et al. (1997) have proposed a very similar notion as an explanation for category-specific cases in Alzheimer's disease. Their simulation was based on the visual and associative feature model proposed by Farah and McClelland (1991) , but included the differential intercorrelation that occurs between the features making up living and non-living kinds. With increasing levels of damage, their simulation showed a linear decline in performance for the non-living things but a non-linear function for the living kinds (see Fig. 7 , p. 274). In early stages of damage, there was little impact on animate concepts but this was followed by a catastrophic decline. When the two functions were combined, the model predicted that with small degrees of impairment patients should exhibit better performance for the biological kinds. With increasing damage there was a crossover between the categories such that scores were better for non-living things (although performance on these items was not intact either).
This intercorrelation theory is appealing in that it does not rely on damage to specific subtypes of attribute (visual or associative) to produce a double dissociation between living and non-living categories, and thus provides a possible explanation for the category-effects observed here. It is interesting to consider the nature of DB's definition and drawing performance. Although her drawings of nonliving things were not intact, they did preserve the differences amongst the exemplars, which was not the case in the living domain. In this category 29/32 animals were drawn as a horizontal, four-legged prototypical creature. It seems possible that this effect could be explained by intercorrelations amongst living things. Intercorrelation may be able to support animate representations under mild semantic impairment (which is one possible exlanation for IW's relatively good performance on this category) but with greater damage item-specific information will no longer be retrieved, so that damage may 'pull' the representations of the unusual living creatures (e.g. crabs, giraffes, etc.) towards the prototype. (For further demonstrations of prototype effects in categoryspecific cases see Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Moss et al., 1998.) It should be noted that the theory proposed by Gonnerman et al. does have its critics. Their model predicts that the direction of the category-specific effect will depend on the degree of impairment. Garrard et al. (1998) have recently completed a cross-sectional study of 58 DAT patients in which they observed a small number of cases with category-specific comprehension and naming deficits. This most commonly favoured non-living over living things, although there were a small number in the reverse direction. In contrast to the intercorrelation prediction, Garrard et al. found no evidence to suggest that the direction of the category-specific deficit was related to the degree of impairment. In addition their theory does not predict why some patients (including our own DB) seem to exhibit a clear deficit for animals with only mild comprehension impairments. Gonnerman et al., themselves, report two individual cases studies that do not seem to fit with their own hypothesis. Patient GP presented with very good performance for artefacts (95-100%) but was impaired for living things (70-80%), while patient NB exhibited a difference to approximately the same degree but in favour of the biological kinds (session three: biological kinds 100%, artefacts 65%).
Evolutionary-adapted domain-specific knowledge systems Caramazza and Shelton (1998) have contrasted the reductionist approaches of the differential-weighting hypothesis (a modality-specific reductionist theory) and the featureintercorrelation theory (a modality-neutral reductionist approach) against a domain-specific semantic organization. We have already mentioned one domain-specific theory, the self-organizing model (Ritter and Kohonen, 1989) , which provides a mechanism by which category knowledge can be encoded within a neural system. Caramazza and Shelton, on the other hand, suggest that evolutionary pressures have lead to a specialized, distinct neural mechanism for each of three broad categories of knowledge (animals, plants and artefacts). Category-specific deficits arise from damage to one of these distinct neural substrates without a differential impairment of visual or functional knowledge. Clearly, the data collected from DB and patients like her, are consistent with this domain-specific hypothesis. IW's data suggest that visual knowledge itself can be differentially impaired (see also Basso et al., 1988; McCarthy and Warrington, 1988; Parkin, 1993; Breedin et al., 1994b; Moss et al., 1995; Cardebat et al., 1996; Srinivas et al., 1997; Tyler and Moss, 1998; Lambon Ralph et al., unpublished data) , implying that semantic knowledge may be organized by attribute type and in some other way to produce category-specific deficits.
Caramazza and Shelton note that by assuming neural substrates for plants and animals, the theory predicts the relatively high occurrence of category-specific deficits for these domains of knowledge in comparison to the very low number of patients reported with an impairment for artefact knowledge. (It is entirely possible that this asymmetry is due, in large part, to the effects of cognitive and psycholinguistic variables, both in false positive identifications of patients with category-specific deficits for living things but also missed cases of the reverse dissociation; see Introduction.) They also suggest that patients seem to have impaired knowledge across the whole of the affected domain and so, thus far, there have been no reports of deficits to narrower categories of knowledge (e.g. sea creatures). Thus, this theory makes the testable hypotheses that such patients will not be found and that categoryspecific deficits cannot be explained through a more reductionist approach like the differential-weighting hypothesis or the intercorrelation theory. Although this hypothesis makes a clear prediction with regard to the breadth of category impairments, the mechanism by which categories are formed (evolutionary pressures) is not obviously open to empirical study. In addition it is not apparent, what if any, evolutionary pressure exists for the artefact category unless, as Caramazza and Shelton suggest, this 'category' is represented by the remaining neural substrates that do not underpin the conceptual knowledge of animals and plants.
There are two other aspects that are not currently addressed by this domain-specific theory. First, Caramazza and Shelton do not seem to link each specific mechanism with any particular neural substrate(s) in the brain. Consequently, it is impossible to predict, a priori, which categories should be affected in a patient by considering either the location of brain damage or performance on other cognitive tasks; in contrast, for example, the differentialweighting hypothesis predicts that poor knowledge of living things should follow from impaired visual attributes. Secondly, we have already noted that the naming of living things by category-specific patients can be improved to the same accuracy as that observed for non-living entities when only functional descriptions are supplied (Silveri and Gainotti, 1988; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996; Forde et al., 1997; Humphreys et al., 1998) . Caramazza and Shelton are careful to claim that '(everything else being equal) category-specific deficits should result in comparable impairments for the visual and functional attributes of a concept'. By removing a modality-specific basis from the explanation of category-specific effects (to explain the null result found in a growing number of category-specific cases) it then becomes unclear why naming-to-definition can apparently benefit from the removal of visual attributes.
Aetiology and neuroanatomical correlates
We noted in the Introduction the debate in the literature as to whether patients with DAT do show category-specific impairments. It seems clear that there are a number of individual cases that do exhibit a category-specific semantic breakdown (e.g., DB and others: Laiacona et al., 1993; Gonnerman et al., 1997; Garrard et al., 1998) , although these individual effects can be lost in group studies leading to rather inconsistent results (Silveri et al., 1991; Hodges et al., 1992b; Montanes et al., 1995; Daum et al., 1996; Hodges et al., 1996; Tippett et al., 1996b) . Category-specific effects seem to be a rare event in semantic dementia (Lambon Ralph et al., 1998) if psycholinguistic factors are properly taken into account. Because many of these patients have more severe impairments to visual than attribute knowledge, one might predict a selective difficulty with animate kinds. However, our patient, IW, exhibited no effect on some materials while better performance for living things on other measures (and a significant effect in this direction overall). This pattern has been reported before for a patient with progressive left temporal atrophy (Silveri et al., 1997) , although in both cases the difference between the domains was significant but not profound, and the dissociation was not a classical one. Although we have noted the apparent rarity of category-specific impairment in semantic dementia and DAT, it is not clear that the rate of occurrence in other aetiologies is any greater. Howard et al. (1995) studied 18 aphasic subjects following CVA and found a clear category-specific deficit in only one patient. Category-specific deficits for animate things have been reported most often in patients who have recovered from HSVE. Although HSVE is a common aetiology in category-specific cases, this does not mean that categoryspecific impairment is common in HSVE patients. Kapur et al. (1994) have recently reported MRI and neuropsychology findings for a group of 10 HSVE patients. Although all were amnesic, only four of the ten were noted to have a naming deficit (the authors do not report how many of these exhibited a category-specific effect). Barbarotto et al. (1995) investigated seven HSVE patients and found a significant effect of category (over and above other psycholinguistic variables) in four individuals. However, Barbarotto et al. noted that the patients were selected primarily for their cognitive deficits and thus were not fully representative of the whole HSVE population. We are unaware of any study that looks for the presence of category-specific in an unselected sample of HSVE cases.
Semantic dementia patients would seem to be an ideal set of patients in which to find category-specific impairments. They all present with semantic impairment that is graded by familiarity (Funnell, 1995; Hodges et al., 1992a as a result of progressive atrophy of the temporal neocortex, including the inferior temporal gyrus. A number of authors have noted the possibility that visual knowledge may be underpinned by this particular area of the temporal lobe and as a consequence category-specific deficits for living things might result (Saffran and Schwartz, 1994; Gainotti et al., 1995; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) . In addition, some functional imaging studies have investigated the relative activation of brain regions for living and non-living items. The results from these PET studies differ in the exact number and location of specific activated regions (which may be due, at least in part, to the different experimental tasks employed). However, a number have highlighted the role of the inferior temporal region in the processing of living kinds (Perani et al., 1995; Damasio et al., 1996; Martin et al., 1996) . Like other patients with semantic dementia, IW did have inferior temporal atrophy and worse knowledge for the visual attributes but she did not exhibit relatively poor knowledge of living things. Patients with HSVE or DAT who do show a category-specific deficit can have rather widespread atrophy that includes both the inferior temporal gyrus and medial temporal structures. Although damage to medial temporal structures is associated with the amnesic syndrome, temporolimbic structures could also make an important contribution to the understanding of category-specific deficits for living things. Gainotti and Silveri (1995) note that these structures receive direct and indirect input from all sensory modalities. Category-specific deficits for living things may arise from a combination of medial and neocortical temporal areas (including inferior temporal structures). There seems to be evidence to suggest that damage to either region alone does not lead to category-specific impairments (not all HSVE amnesic patients have comprehension deficits, let alone category-specific semantic impairments). The possible importance for a combination of atrophy is highlighted by the comparison between MF (Barbarotto et al., 1995) and other patients with semantic dementia. MF's classical dissociation between categories resulted from atrophy to medial and inferior temporal structures (somewhat more like the pattern of atrophy seen in HSVE) whereas other patients with semantic dementia do not have medial temporal damage (Hodges et al., 1992a) .
An attempt at a unified theory
We have discussed various neurological and neuropsychological theories of category-specific impairment. Are we any closer to an adequate explanation for these effects? The differential-weighting hypothesis provides an explanation for differential impairment of both living and non-living domains, although our study here (and others in which category-specific impairment is not accompanied by differential attribute knowledge) seems to have undermined this approach. The influence of psycholinguistic factors in these cases is clearly important, although the variables identified thus far do not provide a complete explanation for all category-specific patients. Self-organizing networks demonstrate category-specific organization of the internal semantic space without explicit encoding of category within the input. This could lead to category-specific impairments although it is not clear how this converts into the type of impairment and pattern of atrophy seen in categoryspecific patients (nor into any falsifiable predictions). The notion of intercorrelated features allows for both types of category-specific impairment, but under the current description there is supposed to be a clear relationship between degree of impairment and the direction of the impairment, a relationship for which there is little positive evidence. Caramazza and Shelton's (1998) domain-specific theory would also provide an alternative explanation for much of the category-specific literature, although we have noted one or two aspects which still require attention before this theory is complete.
The notion of intercorrelations seems to go some way towards capturing the confusion between exemplars that occurs in category-specific cases. We have already noted the prototypical drawings of DB (see also De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1994), the prototype effect found in two other category-specific patients (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Moss et al., 1998) , and the relatively high proportion of intrusive information produced in DB's definitions (this has been observed in other category-specific patients; see Forde et al., 1997) . Although small category differences are predicted by the effect of intercorrelated features (Gonnerman et al., 1997) , it does not provide an explanation for the larger differences that can be observed in patients at the early stages of decline (e.g. DB, but see also patients GP and NB: Gonnerman et al., 1997) .
We believe that a possible explanation is one that includes both an inability to activate critical uniquely identifying features correctly and an abnormal degree of confusion between the exemplars of a category. If semantic knowledge is made up (at least in part) by an amalgamation of the information supported by the distributed sensory association areas (Allport, 1985; Warrington and McCarthy, 1987) , then the many direct and indirect projections to and from the temporolimbic structures may encode the relationships within and between sensory-derived attributes (see also Gainotti and Silveri, 1996) . Each concept will be represented by the combined activation across each association cortex (perhaps in differing amounts according to which senses the items are experienced in) and the connections between them. This complex semantic network will be sensitive to the intercorrelation amongst features. Damage to individual types of attribute knowledge (e.g. visual) may not necessarily lead to category-specific impairments because (a) other critical uniquely-identifying features could be directly activated from sensory input and (b) the interconnections with other intact parts of the semantic system can help to maintain sufficient correct activation of any remaining knowledge to differentiate between category exemplars. Isolated impairment to the flow of information through the interconnections may not result in a comprehension deficit as long as the underlying information is still activated by direct sensory input and by any remaining activation passing between association areas. When damage involves both an underlying set of attributes and the interconnections between areas, then there may be no way for individual exemplars within a category to be differentiated from one another. If there is damage to the visual association areas a patient may appear to lose knowledge about the appearance of all concrete objects (cf. IW's drawing and definitions). When the remaining visual information can combine with the activation projected between association areas, animate exemplars may still be differentiated from one another. If impaired visual information is combined with poor interconnections between the association cortices then the differences between animate concepts may not be maintained. Unfamiliar concepts will tend to 'regress' towards the prototype (perhaps as a result of the influence of intercorrelations) and the patient will produce intrusive information. It is possible that the ensuing semantic 'confusion' will propagate from malfunctioning perceptual regions to 'intact' areas supporting different types of information (e.g. associative-functional) (note that this is similar to the notion of 'critical mass'; see Experiment 3, Farah and McClelland, 1991) . If the propagated noise or 'confusion' is relatively mild a category by modality interaction may be observed (e.g. poor visual knowledge of living things). However, with much greater degrees of noise a patient might not be able to produce the correct nonperceptual attributes and thus may not exhibit a difference between attribute types. If a definition containing functional information alone is used as input, the undamaged regions that underpin this knowledge will be able to differentiate between the animate exemplars (note DB's good associative definition-to-word matching or the absence of category-specific effects when naming functional definitions observed by Gainotti and Silveri, 1996; Forde et al., 1997) . Although this information will not necessarily activate the correct perceptual knowledge, the object will be uniquely identified from consideration of the functionalassociative information itself. Consequently, the patient can either match or provide the correct name for a nonvisual definition, even for living entities.
We have had little to say with regard to category-specific effects for non-living things. The small number of reported cases hinders the development of detailed theories for this type of category-specific impairment. In these cases there has been no attempt to probe the status of the underlying information and to control for the full range of psycholinguistic factors (apart from patient IW reported here and Howard et al., 1995) , while the neuroanatomical correlates are based on the examination of CT scans. It is possible that the 'unified' theory described above could be extended to this type of patient. Assuming that artefacts are represented by a relatively different distribution/weighting of critical features than living concepts (this could include functional information together with other differences such as biological versus non-biological motion), then if the neural structures that support these critical attributes are damaged along with the interconnections between areas of the semantic network then exemplars within non-living categories may show the same type of 'confusion' as that seen in category-specific impairments for living things (note that patients with category-specific deficits for artefacts tend to make within-category semantic errors both in comprehension and naming: Hillis et al., 1990; Hillis and Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett and Humphreys, 1992) .
Caramazza and Shelton argue that there seems to be a tripartite semantic organisation. They note that some patients demonstrate selective impairment to knowledge for animals or fruit/vegetables (Hart et al., 1985; Hillis and Caramazza, 1991; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) . The unified hypothesis could accommodate selective impairments for fruit/vegetables assuming that for these concepts there is a relative importance of smell and taste (Gainotti and Silveri, 1996 ; note that olfactory and gustatory information is projected into the temporolimbic systems; see also Warrington and McCarthy, 1987) . Thus if there is a disruption of this type of knowledge together with poor inter-association area activation, a category-specific deficit for vegetables and fruit could arise. Although this hypothesis can address the three broad categories suggested by Caramazza and Shelton, it is unlikely that this reductionist approach could be extended to increasingly fine category distinctions. This follows from the nature of reductionist explanations of psychological phenomena in which differential performance is modelled through relatively graded properties and thus, is incompatible with very narrow category-specific deficits. 
